Pour-Over Provisions and Estate Planning by Marcus, Robert S.
Volume 70 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 70, 
1965-1966 
1-1-1966 
Pour-Over Provisions and Estate Planning 
Robert S. Marcus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Robert S. Marcus, Pour-Over Provisions and Estate Planning, 70 DICK. L. REV. 158 (1966). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol70/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
POUR-OVER PROVISIONS AND ESTATE PLANNING
By ROBERT S. MARCUS*
A dispositive provision in an otherwise valid will directing the
distribution of any part of an estate to a trust, the terms of which
are not recited in the will, is commonly called a "pour-over" clause.1
This provision necessitates an investigation outside of the will to
comprehend fully the testator's dispositive scheme and to effectuate
it. A question immediately arises as to the validity of such a provi-
sion in light of the statute of wills.
2
Distribution of one's property after death is a statutory power.
It may be accomplished in two ways. A decedent who does not
attempt to allocate his net assets upon death brings into operation
the intestacy laws which define the disposition of his property.3
As an alternative, every state allows the deceased to create a dis-
tributive plan of his own, with certain limitations such as those
designed to protect the surviving spouse.4 To assist the state in
carrying out the decedent's plan, the statute of wills prescribes
formalities which the testator must follow to communicate his
wishes to his executors and heirs and the probate court.5 Gen-
erally, a will must be in writing, signed by the decedent and wit-
nessed by two or three persons.6 The chance of undue influence
or fraud is minimized and the testator's capacity and intent to
write a will is more easily demonstrable after his death. Courts
have generally construed the wills statute strictly so as to effectu-
ate its protective policy.
7
The ultimate question is the compatability of the pour-over
provision with the policies behind the statute of wills. In seeking
an answer, the reasons for using pour-over clauses in estate plan-
ning and the effect of such clauses must be examined more closely.
* B.A., 1962, Lafayette College-Phi Beta Kappa; LL.B., 1965, Yale
Law School; member, New Jersey Bar; law secretary to the Hon. Walter H.
Conklin, Judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey.
1. ATKINSON, WILLS § 80 (2d ed. 1953); SHATTUCK & FAR, AN ESTATE
PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 96 (2d ed. 1956); Note, 62 DICK. L. REV. 346 (1958).
2. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 101-10 (1953); N. J. REV. STAT. § 3A:
3-1-32 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.1-.22 (1950).
3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 501-515 (1953); N. J. REV. STAT. §§ 3A:
4-1-12 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1.1-.17 (1950).
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 321 (1953); N. J. REV. STAT. § 3A:37-1
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.8 (1950).
5. See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 1; SHATTUCK & FARR, op. cit. supra
note 1.
6. E.g., N. J. REV. STAT. § 3A:3-2 (1953). But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 180.4 (1950).
7. In re Hale, 21 N. J. 284, 121 A.2d 511 (1956); James' Estate, 329 Pa.
273, 198 Atl. 4 (1938); 2 PAGE, WILLS § 19.4 nn. 19-24 (3d ed. 1960).
POUR-OVER PROVISIONS
Using a pour-over provision can unify the administration of
trust and probate assets. Hopefully, this will reduce administra-
tive costs because it avoids the necessity of creating a second trust
similar to the first one. If the testator is not the trustee, the ad-
vantage of continued management uninterrupted by death can be
gained for the trust. The duration of the estate's administration
will conceivably be shortened by such a pour-over provision.
This provides a cost saving and puts the trust assets to more produc-
tive use at an earlier date. If the assets are added to an inter vivos
trust, the cost of court supervised accountings and transactions
usually can be avoided. Courts generally maintain a greater degree
of supervisory control over testamentary trusts than they do with
inter vivos trusts because testamentary trusts are usually within the
probate court's continuing jurisdiction. Inter vivos trusts, on the
other hand, might only come before a court of general jurisdiction
for special rather than routine matters.'
Pour-over provisions do not result in significant tax benefitsY
State and federal tax advantages secured by the use of trusts and
insurance are not enhanced by the use of a pour-over clause. Nor
is there any tax handicap to using such a device. As a result, fur-
ther study can generally be limited to the value of pour-over pro-
visions as an estate planner's tool for best carrying out the dece-
dent's wishes unhindered by the possibility of altering the testator's
basic dispositive plan to achieve greater tax savings or by a fear
that larger tax costs will be incurred.
A unified trust not only provides administrative efficiency, but
creates administrative flexibility resulting in the reduction of risk
through investment diversification. Consolidated trust assets may
also provide new investment opportunities unavailable to smaller
trusts. Professional management is more readily feasible with
larger trusts than with smaller ones.
When the settlor-testator uses an amendable or revocable inter
vivos trust, he will be able to adjust his dispositive pattern in the
light of the trust's experience. Written trust alterations are nor-
mally executed in the presence of or with the assistance of a disin-
terested party, such as counsel, or an investment advisor. It is sug-
gested that this deliberation involves as much "formality" (minus
the two or three witnesses when required) as do proper will
changes and, therefore, should not be considered contrary to the
policies of the statute of wills.
8. Examples of such special matters are attempts to surcharge a
trustee for misconduct or to remove him or to compel distribution by a
trustee. Problems of the nature of trust investments and the propriety of
a trustee's discretion are less likely to come before a court with an inter
vivos trust than with a testamentary trust. See Wells Fargo Bank v.
Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 1, 193 P.2d 721 (1948).
9. Kajan, Pour-Over Trust, 13 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rsv. 544 (1964); But see
McClanahan, Bequests to an Existing Trust - Problems and Suggested
Remedies, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 267 (1959).
Winter 1966]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Use of a trust and a pour-over provision precludes the pub-
licity inherent in a will. This may be a valuable means of keeping
family and business plans private. Also, attempts to upset the will
may be made more difficult when a long established trust is in-
volved.
Attention should now be centered on two concepts which ma-
terially affected the development of pour-over provisions: the doc-
trines of incorporation by reference and independent significance.10
Examination of these doctrines and their differences will shed light
on the creation of the pour-over device as well as illustrate the con-
ditions that have motivated legislative action in forty states.
The doctrine of incorporation by reference provides that a will
may, by the use of appropriate language, incorporate into its text
the content of an extrinsic document even though the latter does not
conform to the statute of wills." The historical justification for this
exception to the statute of wills was due in part to the fact that
originally wills were handwritten. Re-copying long schedules of
personal property could be avoided.1
2
INCORPORATION By REFERENCE
To invoke the doctrine of incorporation by reference four re-
quirements must be met. First, the will, as the incorporating docu-
ment, must reflect the testator's intention to incorporate the ex-
trinsic document into the will. Secondly, the language of the
will must refer to the written instrument as already existing at the
time of the execution of the will. This requirement is based on
the theory that a will represents the testator's intent as of the time
of its execution, although it "speaks" as of the date of death. To
prove this intention, the document must be demonstrable as of the
execution date of the will. Furthermore, the reference in the will
must be sufficiently clear so as to identify the incorporated docu-
ment with reasonable certainty. And finally, the incorporated
document must contain satisfactory proof that it is the instrument
referred to in the will and that it was in existence when the tes-
tator's will was executed.13
10. ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 80, 81; 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES §§ 105, 106 (2d ed. 1965); 2 PAGE, Op. Cit. supra note 7, at § 19.17;
1 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 54.1, 54.2 (2d ed. 1956).
11. The application of the doctrine of incorporation by reference is
not limited to the fields of estates and trusts although it has been narrowly
defined here. It can be applied to many other areas of law. (E.g., real
property - multiple deeds; corporate law - charter and by-laws; secured
finance - mortgages, debentures).
12. McClanahan, supra note 8, at 273 & n. 36.
13. See Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore P. C. 427, 14 Eng. Rep. 757 (1858)
for a thorough discussion of the doctrine of incorporation by reference.
See also the following cases for other problems that have confronted Amer-
ican courts: Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir.
1921); Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 230 S.W.2d 51 (1950); Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196- N.E. 920 (1955); Bemis
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Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. 14 is a landmark case
in the area of pour-over provisions because of the numerous diffi-
culties it embodied. Testator executed a trust instrument and de-
livered his securities to the trustee. The income of the trust was
to go to the testator for life, and upon his death, sufficient se-
curities were to be converted to cash for the payment of certain
sums to designated beneficiaries. Testator reserved the right to
amend or revoke the trust at any time. Modifications were made
to the trust later in that year. On the same day that he had exe-
cuted the trust, testator had executed his last will. The residuary
clause of the will ordered all remaining property to be converted to
cash and given to the trustee "to be held, managed and disposed of
as a part of the principal of the estate and property held by it in
trust for my life and the lives of others in the same manner as
though the proceeds of such sales had been deposited by me as a
part of said trust estate and property."15
The majority of the court declared that the testamentary
scheme of the residuary clause contradicted the statute of wills.
The court said that "a testator cannot by his will prospectively
create for himself a power to dispose of his property by an instru-
ment not duly executed as a will or codicil."1" While this is un-
deniably true, the court did not state whether the bequest was
void because of the amendability of the trust. Although a dis-
tinction exists between the power to amend and an actual amend-
ment to the trust, this problem was not faced in Atwood because
the trust was amended after the last codicil to the will. The court
based its decision on the fact that the bequest was void for in-
definiteness because the residuary clause apparently meant to
cover trust provisions then existing and thereafter made by the
testator.
It is suggested that the court's decision in Atwood was correct
although it apparently yielded a result quite contrary to the testa-
tor's intention. The court's inability to discover an intention to
incorporate the trust by reference was of crucial significance. It
led the court to view the residuary clause as a bequest to the
trustee of a trust whose content was undeterminable. If there had
been an intent to incorporate by reference, the trust instrument,
v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146 N.E. 277 (1925); In re York's Estate, 95 N.H.
435, 65 A.2d 282 (1949); Condit v. DeHart, 62 N. J. L. 78, 40 Atl. 776 (1898);
Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932); Matter of Fowles, 222
N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918); In re Piffard's Estate, 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E.
718 (1888); President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172
Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1939); Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky,
79 Ohio App. 73, 70 N.E.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1946); Koeninger v. Toledo Trust
Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (Ct. App. 1934); First Central Trust Co.
v. Claflin, 49 Ohio L. Abs. 29, 73 N.E.2d 388 (C.P. 1947).
14. 275 Fed. 513 (lst Cir. 1921).




as of the date of the last valid codicil, would be incorporated into
the testator's will. Since only its terms are incorporated and not the
actual trust,17 it would seem that only the instrument need be in
existence at the time of reference (i.e. the execution of the will) and
not the trust itself. The bequest would create a testamentary
trust under the will rather than be an addition to the inter vivos
trust. This clearly was not the intent of the testator in Atwood.
18
The importance of the testator's intention to incorporate by
reference was demonstrated in Bemis v. Fletcher."9 A wife's will
was executed leaving the residuary estate to her husband or, if he
predeceased her, to the trustees of the trust set up by his residuary
estate to be administered in the same manner as was his trust.
The husband's will had been executed and the last codicil dated
prior to the execution of the wife's will. The husband then pre-
deceased his wife. In upholding the incorporation by reference, the
court noted the clear intention in the wife's will to incorporate her
husband's existing will. The court went on to state that the wife's
will created a trust independent of that of her husband even though
17. See 2 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 19.17.
18. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E.
920 (1935) for a discussion of the problem of double legacies when there
are two trusts. The harsh effect of the Atwood decision was ameliorated
in Merrill v. Boal, 47 R.I. 274, 132 Atl. 721 (1926). The trust instrument
was admitted to probate on the basis of its being executed with the formal-
ity of a will. The trust agreement had been signed by the testator on the
same day that he executed the will. Then two witnesses signed the trust
document two days later. The testator acknowledged his signature on the
trust document in the presence of the two witnesses. Republication of the
will by the execution of the codicil eliminated the difficulty caused by the
execution of the will two days prior to formalizing the trust instrument.
The court rejected the challenge to the testator's testamentary intention
holding that the testator clearly intended both instruments to operate to-
gether. The way was thus cleared for the executors to transfer the bequest
to the trust company as an addition to the existing trust. This result cor-
responds with that reached in the dissent in Atwood and is decidedly better
than either the outcome reached by the majority in Atwood or that which
follows from a strict application of the doctrine of incorporation by refer-
ence. The court was not called upon to decide the question of whether the
funds added by the bequest were to be applied to the trust as it existed
in its earlier or amended state. Unless the trust amendments were also
executed in accordance with the formality requirements of the statute of
wills, it is suggested that only the terms of the earlier trust should be in-
cluded under the Boal court's reasoning. While the result in Boal is similar
in most ways to that which follows from incorporating by reference, there
is a significant difference in that a testamentary trust was not set up but
an addition was made to the existing trust. Atwood and Boal are only
two cases of a long line of cases dealing with the estate of Theodore M.
Davis of Newport, Rhode Island. See also Ex parte Atwood, 280 U.S. 523
(1929); Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 34 F.2d 18 (lst Cir. 1929);
Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 19 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1927); Merrill v.
Atwood, 48 R.I. 72, 135 Atl. 402 (1926); Merrill v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Co., 45 R.I. 276, 120 Atl. 748 (1923); Davis v. Manson, 41 R.I. 235, 102 Atl.
714 (1918).
19. 251 Mass. 178, 146 N.E. 277 (1925).
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it was to be administered by the same persons in a similar manner.
In Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co. 20 the residuary of the testa-
tor's will was to go to a trust executed three days prior to the will.
Nine days after the execution of the will, a supplemental trust
agreement was executed. The court ruled that the original trust
agreement was incorporated by reference into the will but that the
supplemental instrument was ineffective as to the residuary legacy.
As to the amendability of the original trust the court said:
It is true the original trust agreement reserved the right to
alter, change, or extend that agreement, but when the
donor carried that trust agreement into his will he waived
this right if not done by an instrument complying with
the statute of wills.
2 1
While a jurisdiction may not accept the doctrine of incorpora-
tion by reference generally, it may recognize its applicability in a
limited fashion depending upon the provisions of the incorporated
document. In Matter of Fowles22 the court sustained the exer-
cise of a power of appointment where the original testator provided
that he be deemed to have predeceased his wife in case they died
simultaneously or as a result of a common disaster. In disposing of
an objection to the validity of the power of appointment on the
ground that it violated the New York rule against incorporation of
extrinsic documents, Chief Judge Cardozo said the rule must not be
pressed to "a drily logical extreme. ' 2""
This thought was repeated in Matter of Rausch24 wherein the
court said:
It is one thing to hold that a testator may not impart into
his will an unattested memorandum of his mere desires
and expectations, his unexecuted plans. It is another thing
to hold that he may not effectively enlarge the subject
matter of an existing trust by identifying the trust deed
and the extent and nature of the increment.2 5
The court validated the incorporation by reference in Rausch to an
unamendable and irrevocable trust but cast doubt upon the validity
of other uses of the doctrine, such as a memorandum of which the
dispositive terms are contingent upon certain factors existing at
death.
In President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz,2 6 the
lower court followed the Rausch case and allowed an incorporation
by reference to a revocable and amendable trust. The settlor had
executed a trust in 1933 and amended it twice prior to the date
of the execution of his will. A third amendment had the same
20. 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934).
21. Id. at 495, 197 N.E. at 420-21.
22. 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).
23. Id. at 223, 118 N.E. at 613.
24. 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
25. Id. at 331, 179 N.E. at 756.
26. 172 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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date as the will and the last amendment was subsequent to that
date. The court allowed the incorporation in accordance with the
first three trust amendments, commenting that it would be carrying
the rule against incorporation to a "drily logical extreme" not to
effectuate the third trust amendment as to the property passing by
will. On appeal it was remanded. 27 Rausch was distinguished be-
cause it involved an unamendable and irrevocable trust and should
be limited to its peculiar facts. It was noted that the testator's in-
tention would be frustrated if the property were to be governed by
the original trust instrument and three supplemental modifications
because he had intended the property to be subject to all four
amendments. Although this is undoubtedly true, a disposition of
the property to the testator's wife in accordance with the residuary
clause of the will was also unrelated to the testator's intention.28
INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE
The second important principle in pour-over provisions is the
doctrine of independent significance. This doctrine is defined as a
reference to an act or fact which has significance apart from its
use as to a testamentary disposition. 29 It is considered an allowable
exception to the statute of wills because the act which will affect
27. 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1940).
28. When the residuary clause of the will is the pour-over clause, its
invalidation will lead to the disposition of the property by intestacy. This
is as unsatisfactory as any disposition other than the testator's intention.
In a vacuum, it could be argued that it would be better for the achieve-
ment of the testator's intention to allow incorporation by reference even if
any or all of the trust amendments could not be effectuated in reference to
the involved property, and contrariwise, the argument that the trust should
not be incorporated by reference if all of the amendments are not also
incorporated could just as reasonably be made. The answer lies in the
facts of the specific cases, but in theory the law is not that flexible. See
Stouse v. First National Bank of Chicago, 245 S.W.2d 914, 32 A.L.R.2d 1261
(Ky. 1951) (dictum).
It is urged that the cases considered above be viewed as instances of
gifts to trustees rather than incorporation by reference. This concept has
apparent similarities to the doctrine of independent significance and so
shall be discussed in greater detailwhen that doctrine is considered. Courts
have not used a gift theory in these cases. In Matter of Rausch Chief
Judge Cardozo commented upon this concept but resorted to the criteria of
the doctrine of facts of independent significance in the end. He said:
What is taken as trustee is taken subject to the trust, for it can be
held no other way. A gift to a trust company as trustee of a trust
created by a particular deed identifies the trust in describing the
trustee, like a gift to a corporation for the uses stated in the char-
ter. Only a quibble will find a difference between a gift to a trust
company as trustee under a deed and a gift to the same company
with instructions to hold what is given in accordance with the deed.
The quibble becomes the more transparent when we recall that
by the terms of the deed the trustee had bound itself in advance
to accept a sixth of the estate if so directed by the will.
258 N.Y. 327, 331; 179 N.E. 755, 756.
29. 1 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 54.3; Polasky, "Pour-Over"
Wills, 98 TRUST & ESTATES, 949, 950 (1959).
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the testamentary disposition also has present significance, and thus
it is felt that it will be done for other than solely testamentary
reasons. 30 The independent significance of the act is deemed suf-
ficient to overcome the fear of fraud and coercion which motivates
the formal execution requirements of the statute of wills.3 1
There are notable differences between this doctrine and in-
corporation by reference. The doctrine of independent significance
allows the testator greater latitude in the means for disposing of
his wealth at death. In addition, this concept allows the testator's
behavior subsequent to the execution of his will to affect its dis-
positive terms. Incorporation by reference will not give effect to
acts not in testamentary form performed after the execution of the
will. This gives the theory of independent significance applicability
in many situations in which incorporation by reference should not
be used. The doctrine of independent significance is particularly
appropriate to the pour-over clause when an amendable and/or re-
vocable trust is used and certainly would have yielded a more
satisfactory result in the Janowitz case, if it had been applied.
3 2
Use of the doctrine of independent significance to determine
the content of the legacy rather than the identity of the legatee was
demonstrated by Langdon v. Astor's Ex'r."3  The testator had pro-
vided that designated legacies should not be paid if, during his
lifetime, he gave the legatee an amount equal to the gift in the will.
He specified that the amounts of such advancements were to be
determined by the charges to the legatee in the testator's account-
ing records. The court allowed reference to his books of account to
determine the extent of the legacies under the will. The court ex-
plained this by saying that the accounting entries were features of
a transaction which had independent significance apart from its
effect on the bequest.
In Smith v. Smith34 the chancellor was faced with an attempt
30. This doctrine is most frequently used where a testator leaves a
bequest to "my wife" or "my children". Although the spouse's name or
the children's names are not set out in testator's will, they are easily as-
certainable by extrinsic evidence. It is inconceivable that the act of mar-
riage or of procreating children is done solely or primarily for testamentary
purposes. See Stubbs v. Sargon, 3 Myl. & Cr. 507, 40 Eng. Rep. 1022 (Ch.
1938).
31. See, e.g., Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Pinion, 341 Mass.
366, 170 N.E.2d 350 (1960); Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J.Eq. 294, 140 Atl.
279 (Ch. 1928); Smith v. Smith, 54 N.J.Eq. 1 (1895), aff'd 55 N.J.Eq. 821
(1896) (per curiam); Langdon v. Astor's Ex'r, 16 N.Y. 9 (Ct. App. 1847).
32. A more satisfactory result would have been achieved in President
and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375
(1939) if the court had resorted to the doctrine of independent significance
rather than the doctrine of incorporation by reference when dealing with
an amendable and revocable trust.
33. 16 N.Y. 9 (1847). See 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1106 (1959) (discussion
of problems arising when independent significance is utilized).




to incorporate by reference the testator's plans for a school that
had only been orally communicated to the trustees. Before re-
jecting the attempted incorporation, the chancellor distinguished
the case from one in which the "question is . whether that which
has existence for other purposes than the scheme of the will may
be adopted. ... -35 Not all courts have been able to keep the two
doctrines separate in their analysis of the case before them. Swet-
land v. Swetland36 involved the validity of a bequest by will to an
existing inter vivos trust. Although the court said the legacy was
valid whether or not New Jersey accepted the doctrine of incorpora-
tion by reference, it spent considerable time discussing what it
deemed to be precedent for that doctrine. In the final analysis,
however, it appears that the basis of the court's decision was the
doctrine of independent significance although the court never stated
so definitely.37 The court was also concerned with the possibility
of identifying the ultimate beneficiaries of the bequest but felt that
this was not a problem:
The will itself points the way and removes the difficulty
by referring to the document naming the ultimate bene-
ficiaries of the bequest. Nor is it necessary for us to here
determine who are the beneficiaries of the . .. trust; it
is sufficient that such a trust exists and that the benefi-
ciaries thereof are capable of identification.
3
Although in many cases either doctrine could be applied to
uphold the validity of the bequest, such is not always the case.
The recent opinion of Second Bank-State St. Trust Co. v. Pinion39
clearly demonstrates the practical utility of the theory of independ-
ent significance. The will of husband and wife gave the residue of
their estates to the trustee under an amendable and revocable
inter vivos trust. The trust was subsequently amended. The court
correctly found a clear intention to add the property to the existing
trust rather than to incorporate the trust instrument by refer-
35. Id. at 6, 32 Atl. at 1071.
36. 102.N.J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (1928).
37. The court stated:
... testator merely added additional property to a trust fund
established by him years before the execution of his will under
a valid, active trust and to which he had, from time to time during
his lifetime, added securities. The trust to which this bequest is
added is not theoretical, nebulous, intangible or incapable of iden-
tification, but exists in fact, and the trustee-legatee is as distinct
and definite an entity as would have been an individual or cor-
poration legatee.
102 N.J. Eq. at 297, 140 Atl. at 279-80. The court's language in Swetland
as well as that used in First-Mechanics Nat. Bank of Trenton v. Norris, 134
N.J. Eq. 229, 34 A.2d 746 (1943) lends support to the theory of a gift to a
trustee qua trustee. See Annot. 21 A.L.R.2d 221 (1951). However, while
using such terminology, it is apparent from the same language as well as
other terms and the "tone" of the opinion as a whole, that the court had
the doctrine of independent significance in mind.
38. 102 N.J. Eq. at 298, 140 Atl. at 280.
39. 341 Mass. 366, 170 N.E.2d 350 (1960).
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ence.40 The bequests were viewed as gifts, good on their own merit,
as if payable to any other entity and "no less valid because of the
reservation in the settlor of the power to amend or revoke the
trust."'4 1 The subsequent amendment qualified as an act of inde-
pendent significance and thus the property passed to the trust, sub-
ject to the amendment.
42
Pinion, as well as the other cases concerning independent sig-
nificance demonstrate that in this doctrine the trust "entity" is the
important feature. In the doctrine of incorporation by reference it
is the trust document that is important. The independent existence
of the trust itself and the present significance of its effect on prop-
erty rights are felt to assure their handling in a manner void of
fraud and coercion comparable to the formalities of the statute
of wills. Therefore, the law allows the testator to change his trust
after the execution of his will and still permits the amendment to
affect the testamentary disposition of property passing to the trust
by his will. The law will not give the same effect, however, to the
mere amendment of a trust certificate which does not have conse-
quences on existing property.
40. The residuary clauses provided that the funds paid to the trustee
were "to be held, administered, and distributed solely under the provisions
of such indenture, and in no way as trustee under this will nor as a trustee
subject to appointment by or jurisdiction of any probate or other court."
Id. at 367, 170 N.E.2d at 351.
41. Id. at 368, 170 N.E.2d at 352. As in Swetland and Norris, the
court's language sounds like the gift theory. See supra notes 28 and 37.
However, the court is again basing its decision on the doctrine of inde-
pendent significance. The use of this doctrine is clearly consistent with the
policy of the statute of wills because of the protection afforded by the
affectation of property rights in praesenti. The same is not as obviously
true with the gift theory. Therefore, it is suggested that the judiciary
should wait for legislative instructions before adopting a theory that could
be said to be contrary to the statute of wills in form whether or not it is
in substance. If the gift theory would allow a legacy to the trustee of an
unfunded life insurance trust in which the insured or another person pos-
sesses the incidences of ownership of the policy or to the trustee of a trust
that has been executed in the form of a written instrument but that has
not been established and said trust has been amended subsequently to the
execution of the will, then the protection sought by the statute of wills
will have been voided in form although perhaps not in substance. If the
gift theory would not allow such a transfer, then it would appear to be the
doctrine of independent significance under a different name.
42. In Pinion, the court commented on the increasing use of pour-
over provisions in estate planning and felt assured that the policy of the
statute of wills against fraud was secured in the formalities attendant on
the execution of trusts and the solemnity of the actual transfer of property
to trustees. The court even went so far as to suggest that the long-estab-
lished recognition of the doctrine of independent significance made unnec-
essary the statutory affirmance of the doctrine's application to pour-over
trusts. However, in 1963, the Massachusetts legislature enacted MASS. ANN.
LAW ch. 203, § 3B (Supp. 1964), which closely conforms to the UNIFORM
TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS To TRUSTS ACT. Accord, Canal Nat'l Bank v.
Chapman, 157 Me. 309, 171 A.2d 919 (1961).
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From the foregoing, it should be observed that the doctrine of
independent significance requires the trust to have been established
by the date of the testator's death with other than a nominal cor-
pus. 43 The doctrine of incorporation by reference, on the other
hand, only requires the existence of the trust instrument and not
the establishment of the trust. Under the theory of independent
significance, property is added to the existing trust, thus avoiding
the creation of a second trust which might not be exactly similar to
the first trust. This doctrine certainly provides the testator with
more flexibility and assurance that his intention will be carried out
as it exists at his death, the time when a will is said "to speak." It
provides an opportunity for more successful coordination between
living and testamentary wealth distribution.
STATUTORY ENACTMENT OF POUR-OVER PROVISIONS
Estate planning is a dynamic process, involving lifetime and
post-mortem planning as well as testamentary arrangements. Es-
tate planning practitioners have thus sought to insert maximum
flexibility into the law that governs the disposition of a person's
wealth prior and subsequent to death. The practical defects of the
doctrine of incorporation by reference were seen as its development
progressed from 1858 forward. 44 Although the doctrine of indepen-
dent significance is a more valuable estate planning tool, the uncer-
tainty of its being accepted by state courts has motivated practi-
tioners to seek legislative relief.
45
For this reason, there has been a wave of legislation in the last
ten years attempting to define the permissible limits of testamen-
tary additions to trusts. In 1960 the Uniform Testamentary Addi-
tions to Trusts Act 46 was proposed and subsequently approved by
the American Bar Association.47 Of the forty states that have en-
acted statutes dealing with pour-over provisions, nineteen have
presently accepted the Uniform Act without significant modifica-
tions. 48 While the Uniform Act is the most substantial legislative
43. The determination of what amount is "other than a nominal cor-
pus" is not a small task. There is no rational, absolute standard so a
court will have to decide by studying the nature and value of the property
to be added to the trust, the settlor's intent in creating the trust, if ascer-
tainable, and his subsequent conduct in reference to it. For a view ex-
pressing the futility of attempting to make this determination see Flick-
inger, The "Pour-Over" Trust and the Wills Statutes: Uneasy Bedfellows,
52 Ky. L. J. 731 (1964).
44. See 1 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 54.2.
45. See UNIFORM TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT, 9C U.L.A.
(Supp. 1965) (Commissioner's Prefatory Note). See also N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 3A: 3-16.1 (1953) (introductory statement).
46. UNIFORM TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT, 9C U.L.A.
(Supp. 1965).
47. See Report, 85 A.B.A. REP. 342 (1960) (appendix).
48. The following statutes substantially conform with the UNIFORM
TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT, 9C U.L.A. (Supp. 1965); ARiz.
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endeavor in this area, it should be studied in the light of the stat-
utes existing at the time it was drafted.
As early as 1953, Connecticut4 9 and Indiana5" had rudimentary
provisions directly applicable to pour-over plans. Connecticut
amended its original enactment in 1957 and again in 1959 before
adopting the Uniform Act in 1961. Indiana, however, has never
altered the pertinent provisions relating to pour-over provisions:
the theory of incorporation by reference; 51 and the doctrine of facts
of independent significance. 52
In 1955, Illinois enacted a testamentary additions to trusts pro-
vision that might be deemed the first modern pour-over statute. 53
It permits a devise or bequest to an amendable or revocable trust
identified in the testator's will if the trust is evidenced by a written
instrument existing at the date of the execution of the will. Unless
the will provides otherwise, the property transferred shall be ad-
ministered according to the terms of the trust as amended at the
time of the testator's death. No provision was made for the devise
or bequest in case the trust had terminated or been revoked prior
to the testator's death. In 1957, Wyoming enacted an exact dupli-
cate of the Illinois act 54 and the Delaware legislature passed a pro-
vision worded differently but similar in substance.55
Also in 1955, North Carolina enacted a more detailed provision
than the Illinois Act.56 It provides that a devise or bequest shall
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-141-143 (Supp. 1965); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-601
(Supp. 1965); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-173(a) (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 68-1101 (Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE § 633.275 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 7 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 203, § 3B (Supp. 1964); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 26.78(1)-(4) (Supp. 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.223 (Supp.
1965); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 56-07-01-04 (Supp. 1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 563-A (Supp. 1965); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A:3-16.1-.5 (1953); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 33-7-1-3 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §§ 301-304 (Supp. 1965);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-296 (1962); S.D. CODE § 59.05 (Supp. 1963); TENN CODE
ANN. § 32-307 (Supp. 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2329 (Supp. 1965); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 4058 (1961).
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-173 (1960).
50. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-601(h)-(j) (1953).
51. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-601(h) (1953).
52. A third provision, IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-601(j) (1953), appears to
be an exception to section 6-601(h). Section 6-601(j) allows a devise or
bequest to a trust to be applied in accordance with the trust provisions then
in existence, even if these are other than the trust terms effective at the
time that the will was executed. While there is no mention of the scope of
this section in the statute itself, the comments suggest that it is limited to
testamentary transfers to public charitable trusts. In the absence of cases
construing this section, it appears that the commissioner's comment are the
most authoritative statement of the section's applicability. Thus, only sec-
tions 6-601 (h) and 6-601 (i) appear pertinent to private trusts. See ORE.
REV. STAT. § 224.070 (1953) (specifically requires trust be in existence at
testator's death).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 43(a) (Supp. 1965).
54. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2-53 (1957).
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 111 (Supp. 1964).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-47 (Supp. 1965).
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not be invalid because the trust instrument or an amendment there-
to, made by the settlor or another person, is not executed in the
form required for wills or because an amendment is made after the
execution of the testator's will. Unless the will provides other-
wise, the probate property shall be distributed according to the
terms of the trust instrument as it exists at the time of the testa-
tor's death and shall not be deemed to be held under a testamen-
tary trust. The devise or bequest shall be invalid if the trust is
completely revoked prior to the testator's death.
The Mississippi enactment closely follows the North Carolina
act.57 Nebraska closely follows the Illinois provision but adds the
North Carolina statement as to an entire revocation of the trust
prior to the testator's death and its construction that the property
transferred will not be deemed to be held in a testamentary trust,
unless the will provides otherwise.5 s
Pennsylvania has enacted a provision whose contents resem-
bled the Illinois and North Carolina acts with two additional fea-
tures.59 First, it declared that a devise or bequest could be made
to the trustee of a trust specifying that an unfunded life insur-
ance trust in which the settlor has reserved any or all of the rights
of ownership in the insurance contracts was included in the defini-
tion of the receptacle trust. This has immense practical significance
because pour-over wills are increasingly being used to transfer pro-
bate assets to a trust whose only present corpus is the contingent
right of a beneficiary under a life insurance policy on the testa-
tor's life.
The second new feature of the Pennsylvania act is the power to
make a devise or bequest to "a trust to be established, in writing,
at a future date: Provided, That any such future trust instrument
or amendment thereto shall be signed by the settlor.' '60 The exact
meaning of this provision is unclear but its implications contain
57. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 5-661-5 (1965).
58. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1806 (1965).
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(a) (Supp. 1964) states:
A devise or bequest in a will may be made to the trustee of a
trust (including an unfunded life insurance trust, although the
settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership in the insurance
contracts) established, in writing, by the testator or any other per-
son before or concurrently with the execution of such will, or to
such a trust to be established, in writing, at a future date: Pro-
vided, That any such future trust instrument or amendment thereto
shall be signed by the settlor. Such devise or bequest shall not
be invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or both, or
because the trust was amended after execution of the will. Unless
the will provides otherwise, the property so devised or bequeathed
shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust of the testator
but shall become and be a part of the principal of the trust to
which it is given to be administered and disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the instrument establishing such trust and
any amendment thereof. An entire revocation of the trust prior
to the testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest unless
the will directs otherwise.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(a) Supp. 1964).
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startling innovations in the law of pour-over wills and trusts. The
receptacle trust need not have been executed prior to the execution
of the testator's will. While this is certainly different from any
prior legislation and also that which has been subsequently enacted,
it is a reasonable extension of the wills law of Pennsylvania when
the settlor is also the testator. In Pennsylvania, a will need be
signed only by the testator and need not be witnessed under
normal conditions. 61 Therefore, the execution of a trust instru-
ment signed by the testator-settlor is similar to the execution of a
codicil, if it is not, in fact, exactly that.
When the settlor is not the testator and the trust is created
after the testator's will is executed, Pennsylvania has set a prece-
dent in permissiveness. 62 From the language of the statute, it is
unclear whether the trust can be created after the testator's death
as well as before. Similarly, it is not clear if the act permits post-
mortem trust amendments to affect the property transferred by the
will. It should be noted that the statute speaks generally of amend-
ments made after the execution of the testator's will but does not
distinguish between amendments made before and after the testa-
tor's death. While it would not be unreasonable to interpret the
statute in a manner that tolerated both post-mortem trusts and
post-mortem trust amendments, it is questionable whether a court
will do so without clear legislative authorization. A court might
analogize the case in which the trust has not been created at the
time of the testator's death to the revocation provision of the stat-
ute and invalidate the devise or bequest unless the will provides
otherwise.
Similar doubt exists as to the Florida provision. 63 It allows
amendments to the trust to be made after the execution of the tes-
tator's will but does not differentiate between amendments made
before and after the testator's death. It would be reasonable to
say that the statute therefore allows post-mortem trust amend-
ments. Whether the Florida courts will so hold in the absence of a
clear legislative statement is uncertain.
The changing views of legislators toward the use of pour-over
plans are illustrated by the history of Wisconsin's pour-over provi-
sion section. The 1955 enactment codified the doctrine of incorpora-
tion by reference. 64 A 1957 amendment allowed trust amendments
made subsequent to the re-execution or republication of the settlor's
will to affect property devised or bequeathed by the will.65 This
amendment gave Wisconsin law breadth comparable to the doctrine
of independent significance when the testator is also the settlor of
61. PA. STAT. ANN. titl. 20, § 180.4 (1950).
62. See Woods, Wills and Administration, 19 U. PiTT. L. REV. 327, 328-
30 (1958).
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.17 (1964).
64. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 231.205(3) (1961).
65. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 231.205(3) (1961).
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the trust. It should be noted that the amended provision initially
speaks generally of receiving property by devise or bequest but
then indicates that it is only referring to transfers from the settlor's
will. It is not clear what effect, if any, a trust amendment subse-
quent to the execution of a testator's will has on the property de-
vised or bequeathed to the trust when the testator is not the
settlor. It is also unclear whether a post-mortem trust amendment
might be effective as to the poured-over property. In the absence
of a clear statutory provision, it is unlikely that a court will hold
such an amendment to be operative on the property devised or be-
queathed. In 1963 the provision was again amended to acknowledge
the acceptability of insurance trusts. 6 It allows the right to re-
ceive the proceeds as beneficiary of an insurance policy to consti-
tute corpus sufficient to validate any trust and makes any valid
trust eligible to receive life insurance proceeds. It further pro-
vides that life insurance proceeds received by a trust shall be ad-
ministered according to the terms of the trust as they exist at the
time of the insured's death.
Virginia's pour-over provision includes unfunded insurance
trusts.6 It also provides for devises and bequests made to trusts
that were either partially or entirely inoperative at the time of the
testator's death. It should be noted that as early as 1946 Virginia
has a statutory provision which allowed incorporation by reference
to educational, charitable or eleemosynary trusts.68
In 1959, Colorado69 and Maryland 70 enacted pour-over legisla-
tion. These enactments are similar to the common features of those
acts already discussed with the exception that Maryland has chosen
to differentiate between the effect on a devise or bequest of an en-
tire revocation prior to the death of the testator and a termination.
71
An entire revocation prior to the testator's death invalidates the
devise or bequest, but a termination of the trust does not do the
same thing. The significance of this distinction appears to be in
the difference between the two events. A revocation is accom-
plished by the unilateral action of the settlor; a termination, on the
other hand, occurs when the beneficiaries consent to a termination,
when the trustee acquires the interests of the beneficiaries, when
the trust is exhausted or when the operation of law or the terms
of the trust so provide. While revocation and termination are de-
cidedly different ways of creating a similar situation, the merit of
presuming that the testator would want the transfer to lapse in one
case and to be carried out in the other is questionable.
66. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 231.205(7) (1961).
67. 'VA. CODE ANN. § 64-71.1 (Supp. 1964).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-32 (1949).
69. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 152-5-45 (1963).
70. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 350A-C (1957).
71. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 350A(3), A(4) (1957).
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UNIFORM TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT
The process that ultimately produced the Uniform Act came to
the forefront in 1959. With the above legislation as a background,
the Committee on Fiduciary Legislation of the Trust Division of
the American Bankers Association drafted the Model Pour-over Will
Act.7 2 The act was referred to the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws which held a hearing on it and
undertook further study and revision. The provision was also con-
sidered by state legislatures and enacted substantially as initially
written in Montana,7 3 Rhode Island
74 and Washington. 75
In 1960, after inserting a permissive provision as to trust amend-
ments made subsequent to the testator's death and making a few
minor alterations, the National Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts
Act76 which is substantially similar to the Model Pour-over Wills
Act. The Uniform Act is the most significant legislative endeavor
in this area. Its contents deserve careful and critical review.
Section 1 of the Uniform Act states:
A devise or bequest, the validity of which is determinable
by the law of this state, may be made by a will to the trus-
tee or trustees of a trust established or to be established by
the testator or by the testator and some other person or per-
sons or by some other person or persons (including a fund-
ed or unfunded life insurance trust, although the trustor
has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance
contracts) if the trust is identified in the testator's will and
its terms are set forth in a written instrument (other than a
will) executed before or concurrently with the execution of
the testator's will or in the valid last will of a person who
has predeceased the testator (regardless of the existence,
size, or character of the corpus of the trust). The devise or
bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is amendable
or revocable, or both, or because the trust was amended af-
ter the execution of the will or after the death of the testa-
tor. Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, the prop-
erty so devised or bequeathed (a) shall not be deemed to be
held under a testamentary trust of the testator but shall be-
come a part of the trust to which it is given and (b) shall be
72. TRUST BULL. 23 (1959).
73. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 91-321 (1964).
74. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-6-33 (Supp. 1965).
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.250 (1963). The New Jersey legislature
passed the Model Act in 1959 but it failed to become law when the governor
refused to sign it. Minutes of General Assembly, N.J. 495, 633 (1959). The
governor's "pocket veto" stemmed from the belief that the problem re-
quired further study. Veto Messages, Governor Robert B. Meyner, Assem-
bly Bill No. 347 (March 4, 1960).
76. 9C U.L.A. (Supp. 1965). See also Proceedings, Committee of the
Whole, Nat'l Conference of Comm'r on Uniform State Laws, Chicago, Ill.
[August 25, 1960 (typewritten transcript)].
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administered and disposed of in accordance with the provi-
sions of the instrument or will setting forth the terms of the
' trust, including any amendments thereto made before the
.death of the testator (regardless of whether before or after
the execution of the testator's will), and, if the testator's
will so provides, including any amendments to the trust
made after the death of the testator. A revocation or ter-
mination of the trust before the death of the testator shall
cause the devise or bequest to lapse."
The act -permits devises and bequests made by a will to the
trustee of a trust, whether the trust has been established at either
the date of execution of the will or at the time of the testator's
death. The trust, however, must have been executed prior to or
concurrently with the execution of the testator's will and must be
identified in the will. The trust must be created by a written
instrument of trust or in a valid last will of a person who has
77. UNIFORM TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS To TRUSTS ACT § 1, 9C U.L.A.
(Supp. 1965). It is suggested that section 1 of the Uniform Act could be
more readily understood if its form was modified. Note that this adapta-
tion does not change its substantive provisions.
A devise or bequest, the validity of which is determinable by
the law of this state, may be made by a will to the trustee or
trustees of a trust, regardless of the existence, size or character of
the corpus of the trust, if
1). the trust is established or will be established by
a) the testator, or
b) the testator and some other person or persons, or
c) some other person or persons, and
2) the trust is identified in the testator's will, and
3) the terms of the trust are set forth in
a) a written instrument (other than a will) executed be-
fore or concurrently with the execution of the testator's
will, or
b) the valid last will of a person who has predeceased the
testator.
The trust may be a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, al-
though the trustor has. reserved any or all of the rights of owner-
ship of the insurance contracts.
The devise .or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust
1) is amendable, or
2) is revocable, or
3) is amendable and revocable, or
4) was amended after the execution of the testator's will, or
5) was amended after the death of the testator.
Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, the property so
devised or bequeathed
1) shall not be deemed to be held under a testamentary trust
of the testator but shall become a part of the trust to which
it is given, and
" 2) shall be administered and disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of the instrument or will setting forth the
terms of the'trust, including
a) any amendments thereto made before the death of the
testator regardless of whether made before or after the
execution of the estator's will, and
b) if the testator's will so provides, any amendments to
the trust made after the death of the testator.
A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of
the testator shall cause the devise or bequest to lapse.
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predeceased the testator. When the trust is to be created by the
valid last will of a person who predeceases the testator, that will
probably should have been executed prior to the execution of the
testator's will if it is to be identified in the latter's will. The act,
however, does not specifically state this condition. The require-
ment of prior or concurrent execution suggests that the act is
based on the theory of incorporation by reference but further
analysis will demonstrate otherwise. It should be noted that the
Uniform Act has adopted the popular view rather than Pennsyl-
vania's position of allowing a devise or bequest to a trust executed
and established at a future date in reference to the execution of
the testator's will.
The act allows any person to be the settlor of the receptacle
trust which may be either an inter vivos or testamentary trust.
The acts adopted by Montana, Rhode Island and Washington make
no mention of a trust defined by a will but such a trust could easily
be construed to be within their scope. Some states have enacted
separate provisions as to devises and bequests to testamentary
trusts. 7 8 The testator is given maximum latitude in designating the
receptacle trust although in most non-charitable instances the pour-
ing-over will probably be to a trust created by a family member.
Thus, a widow can dispose of her property to the trust established
by her deceased spouse with a minimum of effort.
The core of the Uniform Act is the validation of a devise or
bequest to a trust that is amendable and/or revocable or to a trust
that has been amended after the execution of the testator's will or
even after the testator's death. In view of the limited exceptions
to the statute of wills cautiously granted in the cases involving the
doctrines of incorporation by reference and independent signifi-
cance, these provisions are the significant part of this and all other
pour-over legislation.
The Uniform Act's primary innovation is its tolerance of a de-
vise or bequest to a trust amended after the death of the testator.
While the power to transfer property by will to a trust amended
after the testator's death can be implied from the wording of the
Florida and Pennsylvania acts, the Uniform Act contains a positive
statement that such amendments will not invalidate the transfer.
The validation of the devise or bequest, however, leaves open the
question of what effect post-mortem trust amendments will have
on the testamentary transfer. The act, however, only allows such
amendments to affect the poured-over property "if the testator's
will so provides."
Opponents to the qualification "if the testator's will so pro-
vides" argued that a testator executing a will under the act would
be aware of the consequences of so doing and the insertion of this
78. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE "§§ 1120, 1120.1; MD. ANN. CODE art. 93,
§ 350B (1957); WIs. STAT. § 231.47 (1961) with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
152-19-1 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.7(a) (1953).
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limitation in the statute would create the potential administrative
problem of handling parts of the same trust fund in different
manners.7 9 They posed the problem that would arise when a testa-
tor left a bequest to a community trust that was amended after his
death. An awkward situation is created if the charitable trustees
must petition a court for permission to use part of the trust's assets
in the new manner after a change in the trust's structure.
It was also pointed out by the opponents to this phrase that
the trust amendment might only involve a substitution of the
trustee.80 As the proposed act read, the trust's assets could not be
transferred to the new trustee without a specific will provision so
authorizing it or a court order. Despite these objections, the pro-
posed draft was accepted on the theory that a post-mortem amend-
ment was a significantly unusual situation and that a testator in
many instances would not want it to be effective, but that such
result should be available to him."' In support of the drafting
committee's moderate approach to reform, it can be argued that the
testator should bear the responsibility of indicating his awareness of
the possible effect of an amendment to the trust subsequent to his
death. Contrariwise, it can be said that use of the powers be-
stowed by the act is sufficient indication of knowledge of their po-
tential effect. In reality, the exercise of these powers will almost
always be made with the assistance of counsel whose function is to
prepare a plan that effectuates the testator's wishes and also to
explain to the testator all of the visible alternative results that
might arise from the plan. In drafting a statute, however, the legal
process must make an act applicable to as many situations as are
reasonably foreseeable. Imposition of reasonable safeguards are
wise. They afford protection against unwanted results where ade-
quate counsel has not been obtained. Requiring the insertion of a
provision in the will allowing post-mortem trust amendments to be
effective is sound.
Recognition of amendments made after the execution of the
testator's will and, when the testator's will so provides, after his
death creates doubt as to the merit of the requirement that the
trust instrument be in existence at the execution date of the
testator's will. Apparently, the purposes of this requirement are
to assist in identifying the receptacle trust after death and to be
certain that the testator was fully acquainted with its provisions.
The latter reason pales at the realistic possibility that the trust will
be amended subsequently to the execution of the will with or with-
out the testator's knowledge and collapses when the possibility of
post-mortem trust amendments is specifically recognized. The
act's provisions should, therefore, not attempt to be justified on
the basis of insuring that the testator will know the ultimate dis-
79. See Proceedings, supra note 76, at 15.
80. Id., at 21.
81. Id., at 12.
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positive plan. Also, if the concern is with the testator's intent, the
will, whether it recognizes port-mortem trust amendments or not,
is sufficient to indicate that the testator has reposed his confidence
in another. In such a case it matters not whether the trust instru-
ment is executed prior to the testator's will and amended subse-
quently thereto or executed after his will. When the testator al-
lows post-mortem trust amendments, the case is stronger for allow-
ing the trust to be executed after the testator's will is executed,
and, perhaps, even after the testator's death. In reality, the Uni-
form Act provides another method to accomplish what can also be
done by the use of a general power of appointment.
The statute provides that the property devised or bequeathed
shall become a part of the trust to which it has been given. The
devise or bequest is not to be deemed as held under a testamentary
trust created by the testator's will.8 2  While these provisions
strongly resemble the operative pattern of the doctrine of inde-
pendent significance, it is suggested that it is unwise to attempt to
state that the Uniform Act is based on either this theory or on the
doctrine of incorporation by reference. The act's scope and provi-
sions clearly pass the tolerable limits of the latter doctrine and yet
no mention is made of examining an amendment's independent sig-
nificance before it will be deemed valid to affect the disposition of
poured-over property. There is no need to relate the act to either
of these common law theories. The possibility of unjustifiably re-
stricting the powers of the act by such a linkage should not be
risked.
Finally, the first section provides that the devise or bequest
shall lapse if the trust is revoked or terminated prior to the testa-
tor's death. This is designed to encompass any situation that puts
an end to the trust when the testator has not provided for such an
occurrence. It appears that a revocation or termination subsequent
to the testator's death would have no effect on the devise or be-
quest and that it would pass to the trust for distribution with the
other trust assets. The question arose as to the result if termination
occurred after the testator's death but prior to distribution.
8 3 It
was suggested that the devise or bequest would lapse in such an
instance.8 4 This result is not indicated by the act. If the commit-
tee's intent were as suggested, the act should be rewritten to re-
flect it.
Section 2 of the Uniform Act states that it "shall have no effect
upon any devise or bequest made by a will executed prior to the
effective date of this Act. '8 5 This provision as to the act's effect on
prior wills has been generally but not uniformly accepted. Con-
82. See note 49 supra.
83. See Proceedings, supra note 76, at 30.
84. Id., at 30-31.




necticut8 6 Massachusetts, 8 7 New Hampshire8 8 and West Virginia 9
allow the act to apply to wills executed prior to the effective date
of the act if the testator dies after that date. Michigan allows it to
affect any will regardless of the date of execution of the will as long
as it does not disturb a "final judgment, decree or order heretofore
rendered. . . "9o Minnesota 9' and Vermont 92 also allow it to apply
to any will regardless of the execution date.
Section 3 is the last pertinent provision of the Uniform Act.
It provides that the act shall be construed so as to effectuate the
general purpose of making uniform the law of those states which
enact it.9 3 Beneath these instructions to the judiciary lies the ques-
tion of whether the act prescribes the exclusive method of pouring-
over from a will to a trust or merely an alternative means to the
common law. The terms of section 2 do not help in this determina-
tion since the act's drafters apparently did not have this question in
mind when they wrote the provision of the act's effect on previously
drafted wills. No reasonable implication of exclusive applicability
can be said to arise from a reading of that section.
With the exception of New Jersey, the states that have enacted
the Uniform Act have not answered this question. The New Jer-
sey enactment provides that the act shall not be construed as the
exclusive means for making such devises and bequests.94  If not
preceded by legislative action, this question ultimately may be an-
swered by reference to the rules of statutory interpretation preva-
lent in each state's jurisprudence, but the following factors should
be considered.
In all states, pour-over legislation is a part of the wills act
which is a mandatory statute requiring conformity with its speci-
fications if its benefits are to be enjoyed. The stated purpose of
pour-over legislation is to clarify doubts existing as to the validity of
pour-over provisions in view of the general requirement that a will
be wholly in writing and signed by specified parties. In its clarifi-
cation, the requirements prescribed by the Uniform Act suggest that
only limited situations are being approved. With the affirmative
recognition of certain plans comes the implied disapproval of other
arrangements even if the latter are valid under common law rules.
Thus, in the absence of a specific statement to the contrary, the
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-173(a) (1960).
87. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 203, § 3B (Supp. 1964).
88. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 563-A (Supp. 1965).
89. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4058 (1961).
90. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.78 (Supp. 1963).
91. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.223 (Supp. 1965).
92. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2329 (Supp. 1965).
93. UNIFORM TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT § 2, 9C U.L.A.
(Supp. 1965) (Massachusetts and Vermont omit this section).
94. N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A: 3-16.4 (1953) States:
This act shall not be construed as providing an exclusive method
for making devises or bequests to trustees of trusts created other-
wise than by will of testator making such devise or bequest.
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Uniform Act could reasonably be construed to be an exclusive
method of pouring-over property to existing trusts.
It must be recognized, however, that section 1 provides that a
devise or bequest "may" be made in the prescribed forms. After
reading the entire act, it becomes apparent that the permissive
word "may" was intentionally used instead of the mandatory term
"shall." This suggests the lack of an intent to make the act's provi-
sions the exclusive method. It is urged that the better position
is that the act does not provide an exclusive means. This appears
to have been the intent of the commissioners although it is not
clearly discernable from the prefatory note to the act or the
transcripts of their deliberations.9 5 No matter which interpretation
is ultimately accepted, it appears that the doctrines of incorporation
by reference and independent significance are still generally ap-
plicable to will cases in those jurisdictions which had previously
recognized them. If the scope of these doctrines has been limited,
it is only in the instances of attempted pouring-over to existing
trusts.
While the Uniform Act has been accepted by a majority of the
states that have enacted pour-over provisions since 1960, some states
have turned to earlier legislation in drafting their proposals. Ala-
bama96 and Utah 97 have adopted the Model Pour-over Wills Act
draft substantially as it was proposed in 1959. Legislation in
Ohio9 and Texas99 conforms to earlier enactments.
The Uniform Act, as well as other pour-over legislation, ap-
pears to contemplate that the will and the trust are within the
same jurisdiction. Obviously, this will not always be the case.
Interstate contacts, however, need not create unruly problems..
The will and the trust aspects of these situations are separable so
that, in actuality, a real conflict of laws problem may not exist.
Initially, the pour-over legislation validates the devise or bequest
to the trustee. If the trustee is in a second state whose interests
require the application of its own laws, reference should be made to
the second state's trust administration law. Thus, the law of -the
probate forum has determined the validity of the devise. or be-
quest and the law of the situs of the trust will govern its adminis-
tration. While this is a reasonable accommodation, it is apparent
that the question of pouring-over is especially well suited to uni-
form legislation throughout the states once the initial determination
to permit such devises and bequests is made.
Although any legal generalizations are open to challenge, it is
worthwhile to note in summation the following characteristics of
pour-over legislation, subject, of course, to limited exceptions. A
95. See note 93 supra.
96. ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 4(1) (Supp. 1963).
97. UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-3-23 (Supp. 1965).
98. OHio REV. STAT. § 2107.63 (Supp. 1964).
99. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §. 58 (a) (Supp. 1965).
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valid will is assumed. The receptacle trust may be established by
anyone at anytime although the trust instrument must have been
executed prior to the execution of the testator's last will or codicil.
A majority of the states specifically allow unfunded insurance
trusts and/or eliminate any minimum requirement on the size or
character of the trust corpus. The property so devised or
bequeathed shall be subject to the trust as it exists at the time of
the testator's death regardless of the fact that it was amended sub-
sequent to the execution of the testator's last will or codicil. Only
those states that have adopted the Uniform Act, and perhaps Flor-
ida and Pennsylvania, permit trust amendments after the testator's
death to affect the property passing by the will to the trust. In
the states adopting the Uniform Act this is qualified by only allow-
ing it where the testator specifically provides for it in his will. The
devise or bequest is deemed to be added to the existing trust and
assumes a character similar to property already in the trust. The
trust does not become subject to the jurisdiction of the probate
court nor are special trustee qualifications prescribed because of
the transfer of probate assets.100 Revocation or termination of the
trust prior to the testator's death causes the devise or bequest to
lapse while revocation or termination after the testator's death
merely causes the testamentary property to be distributed accord-
ing to the provisions of the trust.
ESTATE PLANNING
The last perspective in studying the pour-over technique is that
of its application in actual estate plans. The advent of the affluent
society has made more people aware of the need for conscious
planning to allocate wealth both during and after its acquisition.
For both life and testamentary planning, which are actually two
phases of what should be an integrated process, the use of inter
vivos trusts are particularly appropriate.
A young husband or father may begin an estate plan with an
unfunded life insurance trust and alter it as future circumstances
demand. Such a trust should initially be both amendable and re-
vocable and while no federal income or estate tax advantages
would be achieved at this time,'0 ' its trust features commend its
use. As time passes, the settlor may relinquish all of the rights of
ownership of the insurance policy and he or his wife may add suf-
ficient income-producing property to pay the annual premiums on
the life insurance, thus making it a funded life insurance trust.
They may continue to add property to the trust during their lives
and will parts of their estates to it. There may come a time when
the flexibility desired in the earlier years is no longer necessary.
Making the trust irrevocable and/or. unamendable and creating
100. Contra, NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1806 (1965).
101. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038.
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powers of appointment may alter the trust to conform to con-
temporary conditions. Pour-over provisions merely add flexibility
to the forms of wealth distribution plans available to the individual
and have no inherent tax advantages. The inter vivos trust and
both inter vivos and testamentary gifts may be tailored so as to
achieve favorable estate tax results but such an outcome is not a
necessary conclusion from using a pour-over plan. In fact, allowing
pouring-over to amendable and revocable trusts of others may cre-
ate additional tax consequences for the settlor or one possessing a
general power of appointment over the receptacle trust.
Pour-over enactments are general enabling statutes that pro-
vide the property owner and his advisor with increased flexibility
in creating an arrangement that satisfies the needs of the donor and
beneficiaries without violating the spirit of the statute of wills. It
is not apparent, in theory or practice, that the flexibility allowed
by this legislation has or will increase instances of attempted tam-
pering with the testamentary distributive process. As in all other
situations in which such a disturbance might occur, it is hoped that
adverse interests will invoke a public examination and judicial
determination as to the presence of improper conduct. The choice
is between allowing the estate planner the use of a pliable method
or forbidding such divestiture for fear that its use by the uninitiated
might create a situation undesired by the testator.
The statute of wills attempts to protect against fraud and coer-
cion and to effectively ascertain the testator's wishes for the testa-
mentary disposition of his property by prescribing that the testator
must sign a written instrument indicating his apparent cognizance
of the significance of his conduct. The general rule is that the docu-
ment so executed totally embodies the testator's wishes. There are
few exceptions to this rule. The extended processes that )ed to the
limited and often doubtful acceptance of the doctrines of incorpora-
tion by reference and independent significance by courts exempli-
fies the narrowness with which the judiciary views questions in-
volving the validation of wills. In Stouse v. First Nat'l Bank of
Chicago,10 2 the Kentucky Court of Appeals said:
If amendments to the trust instrument are executed accord-
ing to the formalities required of a will, in what respect is
the policy of the law of wills violated by upholding the
amendments?1O03
The rigidity of this approach to validation problems is clearly in
conformity with the statute of wills. 0 4 Thus, legislation to make
102. 245 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1951).
103. Id. at 920.
104. Contrary to the validation of wills, their interpretation involves
few, if any, statutory guides and so the courts have been gradually ex-
pounding a more liberal approach to interpretative problems. See In re
Cook, 44 N.J. 1, 206 A.2d 865 (1965), wherein the court said:
The court will read the testament in the light of all of the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances and will strain towards carrying
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the validity of pour-over plans sufficiently certain to encourage
their use was advisable.10
As an amendment to the statute of wills, the Uniform Act pro-
vides for the recognition of acts with no other significance than
their testamentary effect to be acknowledged even if they are per-
formed after the execution of the testator's will, without the usual
testamentary formalities and by a person other than the testator.
Actual or constructive knowledge on behalf of the testator of sub-
sequent changes in the terms of the trust need not be demon-
strated. The Uniform Act, in effect, creates a presumption of
knowledge by the testator when the amendment is made prior to
his death, although this presumption is not explicitly stated in the
act. The act goes even further by allowing the testamentary trans-
fer of property to be affected by changes after the testator's death
if he so provides. In reality, the legislature has said it is permis-
sible for an individual to authorize another to alter his testamen-
tary disposition. This significant alteration in the statute of wills
brings its alignment closer to the creative realities of modern
estate planning.
It is suggested that the expansion of the wills act is sound and
in accord with the purpose of the statute of allowing a person to
prescribe a testamentary dispositive plan for his property. The
legislature has recognized the decreasing likelihood that people with
wealth will act in a haphazard manner and the increased thought
and effort that go into present-day trust arrangements. By em-
powering the testator with the increased flexibility inherent in
out the testator's probable intent .... So far as the situation fairly
permits, it will ascribe to the testator those impulses which are
common to human nature and will construe his testament so as to
effectuate those impulses .... Though direct statements by the
testator as to his intentions are still being excluded by most courts,
those utterances by him which bear on the construction of his will
are sensibly being received more and more freely by the courts
.... Not only may the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the will be admitted but so also may the circumstances from
then on until the testator's death .... And not only may the
testator's practical construction of his will be received in evidence
but so also may the practical construction of the other interested
parties
Id. at 5-6, 206 A.2d at 867-68.
105. While pour-over acts specifically establish the allowability of
certain arrangements, their intent was to clear up prior doubt. It might
be said that this was done by legislative acceptance of prior judicial prece-
dent and then its expansion to allow certain additional situations not
covered under the common law theories. Therefore, in those jurisdictions
that had previously recognized the doctrines of incorporation by reference
and independent significance, the courts should continue to do so. Since
it is unlikely that the use of these doctrines and the application of the
pour-over act will ever actively conflict, although the same result may not
be secured by analyzing a problem with the three approaches, the courts
should view cases arising under the doctrines and the act permissively to
the extent of upholding the arrangement if it qualifies under any of them,




pour-over provisions for adopting a plan to changed circumstances,
the legislature has acknowledged the soundness of another means
of testamentary disposition and undoubtedly encouraged its use.
It is well established that only a small minority of the wills
probated annually are contested. Of those that have been chal-
lenged to date, no case of reportable significance has arisen in-
volving a pour-over provision in the nineteen states that have
adopted the Uniform Act. With these facts in mind and assisted by
the apparent probabilities as to the care with which estate planning
is done, it is worthwhile to re-examine the Uniform Act to deter-
mine whether its present provisions achieve the desired goal.
Although most situations that are likely to arise will fall within
the boundaries of the present wording of the act, it is suggested that
further liberalizing refinements should be made. The following
proposed amendments are clearly consistent with the Uniform Act's
present purpose, theoretical background and scope.
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO UNIFORM ACT
In the case of a written instrument other than a will, the Uni-
form Act requires that the trust document be in existence on the
date that the testator's will is executed but allows the trust to be
amended after that date and after the testator's death if his will so
provides. Apparently, the trust need not be established until the
property is ready for distribution from the estate. Therefore the
Uniform Act should be amended to allow pouring-over to a trust
executed and established anytime prior to the distribution date of
the testator's estate if his will so provides even if such trust has
not been executed prior to the execution of the testator's will. Un-
doubtedly, the likelihood of a testator pouring-over to a trust that
has neither been executed nor established prior to his death is
small. If the testator is willing to specifically provide for it in his
will, however, it should be no different from the specific recogni-
tion of post-mortem trust amendments in his will.
Where the testator has designated a receptacle trust of which
he is the settlor, obviously, the trust must be executed prior to his
death if the devise or bequest is not to lapse. If he Can amend the
trust subsequent to the execution of his will, it would seem that he
should be allowed to create the trust subsequent to the execution of
his will. This imposes on the testator the burden of clearly iden-
tifying the receptacle trust in his will and the will in the trust
instrument but this -responsibility is far from oppressive.
The present Uniform Act is apparently based on the unlikeli-
hood of the testator allowing the recognition of post-mortem trust
amendments if he is not thoroughly confident as to the honesty and
integrity of the possessor of this power. In reality, this power is
similar to a general power of appointment 0 and will probably be
106. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.
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given only to a trusted relative or friend.1 07 The confidence ex-
hibited by a devise or bequest to the amendable trust of another
could be said to negate the necessity of having the trust instrument
in existence at the time of the execution of the will.
It cannot be denied that the requirement that the instru-
ment be in existence compensates for human inertia so as to reduce
the possibility that the devise or bequest will lapse. It is question-
able, however, whether the Uniform Act should be designed to rem-
edy human inertia or molded to increase the flexibility of means
available to the testator and his estate planning advisor who are
attempting to formulate a viable life and estate plan. With a
validly executed will and, if necessary, testimony as to the circum-
stances surrounding the testator's life from the date of the execu-
tion of his will as evidence for a probate court, it would not be un-
reasonable to hold, in effect, the testator to the comprehension of
his own acts.
The present legislation permits a testator to allow another to
define the terms for the testamentary disposition of his property as
the other person thinks best even if the latter revises the plan
after the testator's death. The proposed revision operates similarly.
Although the usual date for determining heirs is the date of the
testator's death, the power that allows amendment to the trust
after the testator's death would also permit the creation of the
trust up to the latest date of administrative feasibility. As for a
receptacle trust created by the will of another, a devise or bequest
to it should be valid if the will of the other person is admitted to
probate and the testamentary trust is established prior to the dis-
tribution date of the testator's estate making the devise or bequest.
While the above suggestions might be said to go further than any
previously advanced in this field, it must be reiterated that they
appear wholly consistent with the theory of the present Uniform
Act and provide the testator with a greater degree of flexibility.
In conjunction with the above revisions, the Uniform Act
should be further amended to provide that a revocation or termina-
tion of the trust prior to the distribution of the testator's, estate
shall cause the devise or bequest to lapse unless the testator speci-
fies otherwise in his will. To distinguish between revocation and
termination as is done in the Maryland pour-over legislation -is to
involve the legislature in dubious speculation as to the motives of
the testator, settlor, trustee and beneficiaries. A lapse may cause
107. If a devise or bequest is to charity, it would seem contrary to pub-
lic policy to bind the charity to its present purpose and manner of opera-
tions. Therefore, the act should be modified to create a presumption that
post-mortem amendments to a charitable trust are recognized by the
testator unless he specifically indicates otherwise. If the testator desires
that his devise or bequest be used in a more limited manner, he is free to
make it conditional upon the acceptance of his terms. The charity may
then accept or reject the transfer without necessarily restricting its future
operations in other respects.
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the devise or bequest to be distributed as part of the residuary or
even by intestacy. Since the reasons for revocation or termination
of the trust would not be clear, it seems unwise to allow the devise
or bequest to pass as if the trust were still in existence by providing
for the creation of a new trust incorporating the terms of the
former trust. The testator is free, of course, to make an alternative
disposition to prevent a lapse.
An act incorporating the suggested amendments might read
as follows:
A devise or bequest, the Validity or which is determinable
by the law of this state, may be made by a will to the trustee
or trustees of a trust, regardless of the existence, size or char-
acter of the corpus of the trust, if
1) the trust is set forth in a written instrument (other
than a will) executed before the death of the present
testator (the testator who has made the devise or be-
quest the validity of which is being determined) and
the trust is established by
a) the testator, or
b) the testator and some other person or persons, or
c) some other person or persons prior to the final dis-
tribution of the estate of the present testator; or
2) the trust is set forth in the last will of a person who
a) actually predeceased, or
b) by the terms of the present testator's will is re-
garded as having predeceased the present testator,
and the will of said person is admitted to probate
and the trust is established prior to the final distri-
bution of the estate of the present testator; or
3) the present testator's will explicitly provides that the
trust may be executed and set forth in a written in-
strument (other than a will) and established anytime
prior to the final distribution of the estate or the pres-
ent testator by some other person or persons; or
4) the present testator's will explicitly provides that the
trust may be set forth in the last will of another person
and the will of said person is admitted to probate and
the trust is established anytime prior to the final dis-
*tribution of the estate of the present testator.
The trust may be a funded or unfunded life insurance trust
even though the trustor has reserved any or all ownership
rights of the insurance contracts.
The devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust
1) is amendable at any time, or
2) is revocable and/or terminable at any time, or
3) is amendable, revocable and/or terminable at any time,
or
4) was amended prior to the death of the present testator
with or without his knowledge, or
5) was amended after the death of the present testator.
Unless the present testator's will validly provides otherwise
1) the property so devised or bequeathed
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a) shall not be deemed to be held under a testamentary
trust of the testator but shall become a part of
the trust to which it is given, and
b) shall be administered and disposed of in accordance
with the applicable administrative and dispositive
provisions of the written instrument or will setting
forth the terms of the trust including
1) any amendments to the trust made before the
death of the present testator, and
2) if it is a charitable trust, any amendments to the
trust made after the death of the present testa-
tor, or
3) if it is not a charitable trust and the present tes-
tator's will so provides, any amendments to the
trust made after the death of the present testa-
tor; and
2) a complete revocation or termination of the trust before
the final distribution of the estate of the present tes-
tator shall cause the devise or bequest to lapse.
This act shall not be construed as providing an exclusive
method for making devises or bequests to the trustee or trustees
of a trust created otherwise than by the will of the present
testator.
Under the proposed amendments to the Uniform Act, pour-
over plans would not create a greater perpetuities problem than
exists under the present Uniform Act and other pour-over legisla-
tion. Whether the allowable period of the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties starts to run when either the revocable or irrevocable inter
vivos trust is created or at the time of the testator's death in the
case of a pour-over to a trust created after the testator's death,
proper formulation of the plan will sufficiently account for this fact
so as to avoid invalidating the devise or bequest. Recognition of
the Rule's application and drafting the testator's plan accordingly
should satisfactorily eliminate this difficulty.
0 8
Pour-over legislation as written and the proposed revisions are
based on the proposition that it is the function of the decedents'
estates law to allow a testator as much freedom in the management
and disposition of his property as is compatible with the establish-
ment of a system that will effectuate his plans with the least pos-
sible chance of another person's distorting his distributive pattern.
It is unjustifiable to suggest that pour-over acts, as liberalizing
amendments, undermine the foundation and application of tradi-
tional testamentary concepts. It is highly unlikely that the realities
of a pour-over situation will contain the feared abuses that are the
premise of the wills act. Since those who must execute the testa-
tor's plan and supervise its realization are provided with sufficient
information to perform their functions, no disturbance will be
caused to the maintenance of the legal order in this field.
108. See Polasky, "Pour-Over Wills": Use With Inter-Vivos Trust,
17 Sw. L.J. 410, 439 (1963).
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